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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Levon Fred Cordingley appeals from the district court's order affirming the 
magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The facts and course of proceedings relating to this appeal are as set 
forth by the district court in its memorandum decision and order affirming the 
magistrate's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss: 
On February 23, 2008, Boise City Police Officer Stace 
arrested Cordingley after finding him in possession of marijuana 
and marijuana paraphernalia. Cordingley was cited for violating 
I.C. §§ 37-2732(c) (3) and 37-2734A. 
Cordingley later filed a motion to dismiss the charges on 
August 28, 2008 arguing that his actions are protected by I.C. § 73-
402 because he was freely exercising his religious beliefs by 
possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia. During a hearing on 
the motion, Cordingley admitted that he was in possession of 
marijuana but claimed that he was carrying it as a sacrament for 
the Church of Cognitive Therapy. This church, which Cordingley 
created, is "designed specifically for the use of entheogenic 
sacraments to help us get in touch with our spiritual self, in order to 
obtain enlightenment." The sacrament that is vital and mandatory 
to the practices of this church is cannabis, otherwise known as 
marijuana. Cannabis is used as a spiritual enhancer and for the 
purpose of becoming a better person inside, comforting the sick 
and afflicted, and changing negatives into positives. People of all 
different religions join this church because it is a companion to 
religion to help people get in contact with themselves, others, and 
the universe in a spiritual way. The church is multi-denominational, 
as it recognizes all faiths; and it does not require a belief in God 
thought it does encourage the use of cannabis as a sacrament to 
get closer to the creator or the universe. 
The magistrate issued an order denying the motion on 
October 29, 2008 for the reason that Cordingley failed to meet his 
burden of establishing that he was engaged in any religious 
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practice protected by I.C. § 73-402 at the time of his arrest. Then 
in a memorandum opinion issued on January 29, 2009, the 
magistrate further explained that to seek the protection of I.C. § 73-
402, Cordingley must establish that the contested government 
action substantially burdens a religious belief which is sincerely 
held by Cordingley. After examining the evidence presented, the 
magistrate acknowledged that Cordingley's beliefs are sincerely 
held and substantially burdened but found that the beliefs are not 
religious beliefs which are protected by law. 
Cordingley then entered a conditional guilty plea. He filed a 
timely appeal of the magistrate's order and his sentence was 
stayed pending the appeal. 
(R., pp.146-148 (footnote omitted).} 
The district court, in affirming the magistrate's ruling, concluded the 
evidence failed to establish that Cordingley's Church of Cognitive Therapy is a 
religion as envisioned by I.C. § 73-402: 
Cordingley acknowledged that the Church of Cognitive Therapy is 
not so much a religion as it is a companion to a religion. In reality, 
this church presents an ideology or philosophical belief as to how 
people can become spiritual or enlightened, but it does not have a 
comprehensive believe system with the trappings of a religion. 
There is no evidence that the church provides a belief system with 
answers to the problems and concerns that confront human beings 
or that it provides answers to questions about life, purpose, or 
death. The church does not promote a moral code or rely on any 
one set of teachings. Instead, the church provides a sacrament 
that is to be used as an accompaniment to other religious beliefs. 
(R., pp.151-152.) 
The district court originally filed its memorandum decision and order May 
5, 2012 (R., pp.146-156) and Cordingley filed a notice of appeal on June 17, 
2012 (R., pp.154-156.) The court then re-entered its order affirming the 
magistrate court's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss December 2, 2011. 
(R., pp.182-183.) Cordingley timely appeals from that order. (R., pp.184-187.) 
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ISSUE 
Cordingley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did The District Court Err When the Court Affirmed the 
Magistrate's Decision Denying Mr. Cordingly's [sic] Motion To 
Dismiss Based Upon Idaho Code § 73-402 (FERPA)? 
(Appellant's brief, p.g.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Cordingley failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate's order denying his motion to dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cordingley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Affirming 
The Magistrate's Denial Of His Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Cordingley asserts on appeal the magistrate and district courts were 
"greatly confused by the difference between the church [which Cordingley is a 
member of] and a religion." (Appellant's brief, p.23.) Cordingley's smoking 
marijuana, he claims, cannot be separated from his religious beliefs. 
(Appellant's brief, p.24.) Cordingley argues the denial of his motion to dismiss 
was in error because there was "no support in the record for the finding that [he] 
was not engaged in the free exercise of his religion" and such a denial of his 
ability to smoke marijuana is a denial of his "free exercise of his religious belief." 
(Appellant's brief, p.24.) 
Cordingley's arguments are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008». The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." lQ." 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
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the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." Js!. (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
C. The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate Court's Order 
Denying Cordingley's Motion To Dismiss 
Cordingley is not entitled to the protection of I.C. § 73-402(3) as he claims 
because his use of marijuana does not constitute the "exercise of religion." The 
applicable portion of the FERPA, I.C. §§ 73-401, et. seq., is as follows: 
73-402. Free exercise of religion protected. 
(1) Free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that applies in 
this state, even if laws, rules or other government actions are 
facially neutral. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, government 
shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability. 
(3) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person is both: 
(a) Essential to further a compelling government interest; 
(b) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
(5) In this section, the term "substantially burden" is intended solely 
to ensure that this chapter is not triggered by trivial, technical, or de 
minimis infractions. 
The FERPA offers guidance in the form of definitions in § 73-401: 
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(1) "Demonstrates" means meet the burdens of going forward with 
evidence, and persuasion under the standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(2) "Exercise of religion" means the ability to act or refusal to act in 
a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or 
not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of 
religious belief. 
(5) "Substantially burden" means to inhibit or curtail religiously 
motivated practices. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals was recently presented with the question of 
an individual's right to the free exercise of religion through the possession of 
marijuana in State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011). 
When claiming a violation of FERPA, an individual "must carry the burden of 
showing that Idaho's controlled substance statutes substantially burden his 
exercise of religion." White, 152 Idaho at _, 271 P.3d at 1221. The Court's 
inquiry on appeal is as follows: 
Thus, while the issue of whether a belief motivating a particular 
practice is "religious" is a question of law, the question of what 
compromises a substantial motivation behind a defendant's 
conduct, i.e., whether the defendant is motivated by religious (as 
encompassed by the FERPA) or secular purposes, is a question of 
fact-to which we defer to the lower court unless its finding is 
clearly erroneous. 
White, 152 Idaho at _, 271 P.3d at 1221 (citations omitted). The proper test in 
this inquiry is the religious motivation test, which requires a claimant to 
"demonstrate that religion principally motivated the activity in question." White, 
152 Idaho at _, 271 P.3d at 1221, n.3 (citations omitted). Courts must 
determine if an individual is sincere in their "religious objection to a government 
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policy," and are not "forced to accept the individual's assertion [of motivation] 
without further inquiry." kl 
On appeal, Cordingley asserts that "[b]ecause [his] membership is with a 
legally-recognized church [the Church of Cognitive Therapy], his right to utilize 
the sacrament [by smoking marijuana] is protected as a fundamental part of his 
exercise of his religious freedom." (Appellant's brief, p,22.) Additionally, he 
claims that because his religion, Rastafarianism, has been recognized by the 
Ninth Circuit as using marijuana as sacrament, "his free exercise of the right to 
use the sacrament cannot be seriously challenged in this case." (ld.) As the 
Court of Appeals in White pointed out, however, just because an individual "has 
claimed that his impetus for smoking marijuana is religious, does not make it so 
for the purposes of the FERPA." 152 Idaho at _, 271 P.3d at 1225. "To 
establish a free exercise defense, a defendant must show first that his religion is 
bona fide, and, by extension, that his conduct is actually motivated by statutorily-
recognized religious beliefs." White, 152 Idaho at _, 271 P.3d at 1225 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Here, although Cordingley claims to have been "ordained in 1997 in Taos, 
New Mexico, by a Rastafarian Youth Group" (Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.2), he 
identifies himself as "a Christian" (Tr., p.23, Ls.16). He also claims to be the 
founding father of his own ministry: the COTC Ministry or the Church of 
Cognitive Therapy, "which is taking negatives and changing them into positives 
with the use of entheogenic sacraments." (Tr., p.10, LsA-S.) As is his practice 
as a minister in the COTC, Cordingley routinely carries marijuana and 
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paraphernalia for ingesting marijuana because he uses it "to help heal people 
with certain mental, physical, and spiritual needs." (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-15.) Although 
generally always prepared to offer marijuana in the form of a "sacrament" to 
homeless, angry, or confused people it the form of "comfort" (Tr., pA5, Ls.2-11), 
Cordingley concedes that he generally does not offer marijuana to such 
individuals on the street or sidewalk but does so in private to avoid arrest (Tr., 
pp.25-28). Cordingley equates the COCT with a spirituality that enhances his 
belief of the Christian religion and the religious or non-religious beliefs of others 
through smoking marijuana in the form of a sacrament. (Tr., p.29, LA - p.30, 
L.24.) The COCT is "a spiritual community where many different people belong 
to and different people that use cannabis as a religion." (Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, 
L.3.) Cordingley seems to have started the Church of Cognitive Therapy strictly 
as a means to smoke marijuana while avoiding legal repercussion: 
Q: And has your use of the sacrament evolved over time or has 
it been - was it a stated practice and use prior to your coming into 
this? 
A: It evolved over time. There was a point when I did use it like 
most people - recreational. I probably - we don't promote abuse, 
but we promote use. 
There was a point in time when I did abuse it, and I had a 
spiritual experience which changed my life. But at that point, I no 
longer abused it and I began to use it in a spiritual and religious 
way. 
(Tr., p.50, Ls.1-10.) Cordingley developed what he terms a ministry in order to 
smoke marijuana in the name of spirituality. 
The magistrate court denied Cording ley's motion to dismiss finding the 
COCT "is a community within with an emphasis on spirituality, rather than an 
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emphasis on any particular religious beliefs." (R., p.67.) The goal is 
enlightenment and "can be had by Catholics, Jews, and even atheists." (Id.) 
Ultimately, the only "connecting fiber among the various members is their use of 
marijuana" to help in the pursuit of enlightenment. (Id.) In affirming the 
magistrate's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss, the district court 
concluded: 
Based on the language of the statute, the magistrate did not 
err in concluding that Cordingley bears the burden of establishing 
that he was exercising religious beliefs protected by I.C. § 73-402 
before the burden shifts to the State. Additionally, the magistrate 
did not err in obtaining guidance from the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals as to what the court should consider in determining 
whether the defendant has met that burden. Although it may be 
true that the courts should not be put in the position of deciding 
whether a belief amounts to a religious belief, that is the position 
Idaho courts are put in by the statute, and the Tenth Circuit case is 
a well-reasoned decision that provides guidance in an area where 
Idaho case law is silent. 
Not only did the magistrate correctly determine the law, but 
the magistrate based this decision to deny Cordingley's motion on 
sUbstantial evidence. Cordingley acknowledged that the Church of 
Cognitive Therapy is not so much a religion as it is a companion to 
religion. In reality, this church presents an ideology or 
philosophical belief as to how people can become spiritual or 
enlightened, but it does not have a comprehensive belief system 
with the trappings of a religion. There is no evidence that the 
church provides a belief system with answers to the problems and 
concerns that confront human beings or that it provides answers to 
questions about life, purpose, or death. The church does not 
promote a moral code or rely on anyone set of teachings. Instead, 
the church provides a sacrament that is to be used as an 
accompaniment to other religious beliefs. 
(R., pp.151-152.) 
The record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's conclusion that Cordingley's use of marijuana is not substantially 
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motivated by a religious belief. The denial of Cordingley's claim should be 
upheld on the basis that he failed to demonstrate that his use of marijuana was 
part of the free exercise of religion -- therefore, his marijuana use is not entitled 
to the protections of I.C. § 73-402(3). 
Even assuming Cordingley's use of marijuana constitutes the free 
exercise of religion which has been substantially burdened, the magistrate court 
decision should be upheld because, under I.C. § 73-402(3), the state has a 
compelling governmental interest in prohibiting such conduct, I.C. § 73-402(3)(a), 
and has adopted the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, I.C. § 73-
402(3)(b). Cordingley has conceded that "one could surmise that cannabis is 
dangerous or that it leads to drinking alcohol, criminal behavior, drug use, or 
other well established dangerous activities[.]" (Appellant's brief, p.25.) 
The courts below did not reach the issue of whether the state used the least 
restrictive means to further its compelling interest of regulating the use of 
marijuana. However, a conclusion that the state did use the least restrictive 
means is justified. Although Cordingley asserted that his use of marijuana was 
religious, he did not provide specific locations, time frames, or any other 
limitation for such alleged religious practice to take place, other than to provide 
comfort for people in need. Moreover, it would be more than problematic to try 
to monitor marijuana used by Cordingley where he has no set time, place or 
manner in which he uses or administers it. It is difficult to conceive how a less 
restrictive law could have been tailored to reasonably fit any supposed religious 
use of marijuana by Cording ley. Therefore, nothing but a law totally prohibiting 
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the possession of marijuana or paraphernalia is appropriate or adequate to 
further the state's interest in regulating the use of marijuana. 
Cordingley has failed to demonstrate error in the denial of his motion to dismiss 
based on FERPA. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the magistrate court's 
denial of Cording ley's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 5th day of October 201 
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